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Preference for Radical Right-Wing Populist Parties among Exclusive-Nationalists and 
Authoritarians 
-Kris Dunn, Department of Methods in the Social Sciences, University of Vienna 
Abstract: The literature on authoritarianism and exclusive forms of nationalism often implies 
that authoritarian and exclusive-nationalist individuals will prefer radical right-wing populist 
parties such as Austria's  FPÖ.  The theoretical case for such implications appears sound as 
party programs for radical right-wing populist parties invoke rhetoric that should appeal to 
individuals with either of these characteristics.  To date, these implications have not been 
examined.  This paper examines quantitative survey data from 5 Western European countries 
with electorally viable radical right-wing populist parties to determine if radical right-wing 
populist parties are preferred by authoritarians and/or exclusive-nationalists.  Analyses 
indicate that the radical right-wing populist parties studied here are consistently preferred by 
exclusive-nationalist individuals, though not necessarily to all other parties, but only 
inconsistently preferred by authoritarian individuals.  While more nuanced investigation is 
still needed, it is clear that, contrary to the assumptions in the authoritarianism literature, 
radical right-wing populist parties cannot always rely on authoritarian individuals for support. 
Keywords: radical right-wing populist parties, authoritarian predisposition, exclusive 
nationalism 
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A substantial volume of research aims to uncover the causes of support for Radical Right-
wing Populist (RRP) Parties.  Much of this scholarship looks at macro-level causes such as 
unemployment levels (Knigge, 1998), immigration levels (Knigge, 1998; Lubbers et al., 
2002), a combination of these (Bowyer, 2008; Golder, 2003; Jesuit et al., 2009; Rydgren and 
Ruth, 2011), and/or an increase in aggregate levels of political disaffection (Knigge, 1998).  
Individual-level analyses have largely focused on individual manifestations of macro-level 
theses (Ivarsflaten, 2008).  More nuanced analyses examine moderating and/or mediating 
factors such as social capital/cohesion (Fitzgerald and Lawrence, 2011; Jesuit et al., 2009), 
the expansiveness of the welfare state (Arzheimer, 2009; Jesuit et al., 2009; Swank and Betz, 
2003), political opportunity structure (Spies and Franzmann, 2011), or the permissiveness of 
the electoral system (Carter, 2002; Golder, 2003; Norris, 2005).   
While much of this research implies psychological mechanisms, such as threat or insecurity, 
are at work, direct examination of psychological factors in the RRP party support literature is 
underdeveloped, with most of this research focused on attitudinal correlates rather than deep-
rooted psychological motivations (Billiet and De Witte, 1995; Goodwin et al., 2012; Ivaldi, 
1996; Mudde, 2010; Van Der Brug and Meindert, 2003).  Though psychological analyses of 
RRP party support are by no means absent from the literature (Biggs and Knauss, 2012; Blee, 
2007; Ford and Goodwin, 2010; Goodwin, 2010; Lucassen and Lubbers, 2012; Mayer, 2011), 
the dearth of such is curious given that the foundational authoritarianism research sought to 
explain the psychological roots of support for the Nazi party previous to and during World 
War II.  And though Hitler's Nazi party is the quintessential example of an extreme, rather 
than a radical, right-wing populist party (cf., Rydgren, 2007), this is more a matter of 
ideological degree than difference (cf., Mudde, 2010).  It is implicit in the authoritarianism 
literature that those who prefer extreme or radical right-wing populist parties possess an 
authoritarian predisposition (character, personality, etc) or vice versa (Adorno et al., 1950; 
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Altemeyer, 1996; Arendt, 1973; Fromm, 1969).  Similarly, the literature on exclusive forms 
of individual-level nationalism (i.e., cultural/ethnic nationalism (cf., Anderson, 1991; 
Calhoun, 1993; Verdery, 1993)) suggest that such individuals will also be drawn to RRP 
parties.  It is these suggestions that motivate this research. 
The intent of this paper is not to explain RRP party preference.  Nor is it aimed at predicting, 
across countries, specific party-families that authoritarians or exclusive-nationalists are likely 
to prefer ± though some sense of this can be derived from the analyses.  Rather, this paper 
aims to examine the accuracy of the theses, implicit in the literature, that authoritarianism and 
exclusive-nationalism will reliably predict RRP party preference; whether authoritarians and 
exclusive-nationalists prefer RRP parties to all others in all cases.  I therefore do not fully 
delve into the evolution of party systems that gave rise to RRP parties nor do I rely on the full 
population of political parties (were that even possible) in a fully representative sample of 
countries.  By examining RRP parties in 5 established democracies with relatively stable 
party systems, this paper serves as an initial examination of whether authoritarians and 
exclusive-nationalist prefer RRP parties to all other electorally-viable options.  The analyses 
reveal that while exclusive-nationalism is a consistent predictor of preference for a RRP party 
in the 5 countries studied, authoritarianism is not. 
These findings open up a number of questions regarding the relationship between 
authoritarianism and RRP party preference.  The absence of a consistent relationship between 
these variables does not dismiss the possibility of a relationship altogether.  The 
authoritarianism literature can be extrapolated to hypothesize that authoritarians will be more 
likely to prefer RRP parties when societal unity and uniformity is threatened and prefer less 
radical parties otherwise.  Regardless of the actual reason for the disconnect, there is a 
disconnect; there is no consistent relationship between authoritarianism and RRP party 
preference as is often assumed. 
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Authoritarianism 
The overthrow of the Weimar Republic and support for the Nazi party in Germany previous 
to and during World War II spawned considerable academic interest in those who supported 
the Nazi party and regime.  One facet of this research agenda resulted in the description of a 
certain type of individual: the authoritarian.  Over the last half-century, the description of the 
psychological constitution of these individuals shifted from a Freudian perspective (e.g., 
Adorno et al., 1950; Fromm, 1969), through a behavioral perspective (e.g., Altemeyer, 1981; 
Altemeyer, 1988; Altemeyer, 1996), and has recently settled into a social-psychological 
interactive perspective, referred to as the authoritarian dynamic (Feldman and Stenner, 1997; 
Stenner, 2005; Stenner, 2009).  Stenner (2005) argues that authoritarians are cognitively or 
psychologically incapable of coping with diversity and are thereby averse to such.  As a result 
of this aversion, authoritarians are predisposed to express intolerant and punitive attitudes 
when threatened with the fragmentation of society. 
More recent research, elaborating RQ WKH ³FRJQLWLYH LQFDSDFLW\´ DVSHFW RI 6WHQQHU¶V (2005) 
conceptualization of the authoritarian predisposition, conceptualizes authoritarianism as a 
coping strategy (Jost, 2006; Nagoshi et al., 2007; Van Hiel and De Clercq, 2009).  Unlike 
Oesterreich (2005), who considers authoritarianism a result of failed attempts to develop 
successful coping mechanisms during personal development (and thereby to default to 
authorities to cope for them), the authoritarianism-as-coping-mechanism thesis suggests that 
authoritarians possess a normative identity style (Duriez and Soenens, 2006) and are prone to 
coping with stress via withdrawal and wishful thinking (Berzonsky, 1992); authoritarians 
default to the use of strategies that require the least amount of cognitive resources (Lavine et 
al., 2005; Lavine et al., 2002).  As authoritarians failed to develop more socially adaptive 
responses to threatening situations, they respond instead by rejecting, and possibly aggressing 
against, that which they find threatening. 
5 
 
Combining Oesterreich's (2005) insights into the reasons for authoritarian submission to 
authorities (which mesh well with a substantial volume of theory in the authoritarianism 
literature (e.g., Arendt, 1973; Fromm, 1969)) with those scholars who consider 
authoritarianism to be a coping strategy yields the image of an individual who, when 
threatened with the perception of a fragmenting society, is likely to withdraw unless 
presented with a dominating authority figure exhorting ideals of social unity and 
homogeneity.  Such a image is consistent with current research (Altemeyer, 2003; Altemeyer, 
2004). 
Social homogeneity and unity are key rallying points of RRP parties and their leaders.  It is 
no surprise, then, that Oesch (2008) argues that the working class are the "core clientele" of 
RRP parties as research has long found the working class to be particularly authoritarian (de 
Regt et al., 2012; Houtman, 2003; Lipset, 1959), especially in those aspects that predict 
intolerance of difference (e.g., Napier and Jost, 2008).  The bottom line is that when 
authoritarians are threatened with the perception of a fragmenting society, their inherent 
response is to rally behind a strong ingroup leader that similarly rejects anything perceived to 
be foreign.  While cries for national purity and/or unity are not solely the province of RRP 
parties, these parties generally express such messages louder than most.  On this basis, one 
would therefore expect authoritarians to rally to RRP parties above all others. 
There is, however, reason to argue against this expectation.  As noted above, authoritarians 
only become markedly more intolerant and punitive than average when they perceive threat 
to the unity and uniformity of their society.  Further, most conceptualizations of 
authoritarianism strongly emphasize what Altemeyer (1981; 1988; 1996) refers to as 
conventionalism, or "behavioral and attitudinal conformity with ingroup norms and rules of 
conduct" (Duckitt, 1989).  Authoritarians are highly norm-adherent, often adjusting their 
attitudes to conform to groups norms (Altemeyer, 1996; Oyamot Jr et al., 2012).  Stenner 
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(2005) similarly stresses the importance of group norms in her discussion of normative threat.  
Authoritarians desire uniformity and unity around the norms and values of their society (cf., 
Oyamot Jr et al., 2006).  This aspect of authoritarian psychology suggests that authoritarians 
will only prefer RRP parties when they perceive threat to the normative order and where RRP 
parties are perceived as norm-congruent and mainstream. 
Nationalism 
A number of divisions exist in the nationalism literature which make a general discussion of 
nationalism difficult.  For the purposes of this discussion, I focus on a more exclusive sense 
of nationalism, what may be referred to as "ethnic/cultural nationalism," as opposed to a more 
inclusive "civic nationalism": "Hobsbawm [(1992)] identifies the two principal senses of 
nation in modern times as: a relation known as citizenship, in which the nation consists of 
collective sovereignty based in common political participation, and a relation known as 
ethnicity, in which the nation comprises all those of supposedly common language, history, 
or broader cultural identity" (Verdery, 1993: 38).  An ethnic/cultural conception of 
nationalism is similar to what Mudde (2007: 19) refers to as nativism: LH ³an ideology, 
which holds that states should be LQKDELWHGH[FOXVLYHO\E\PHPEHUVRIWKHQDWLYHJURXS³WKH
QDWLRQ´DQGWKDWQRQQDWLYHHOHPHQWVSHUVRQVDQGLGHDVDUHIXQGDPHQWDOO\WKUHDWHQLQJWRWKH
homogenous nation-state´  An ethnic/cultural conceptualization of nationalism largely 
follows from a "primordial" belief regarding the nature of the nation - the belief that nations 
have existed since the dawn of human history.  This sense of nationalism is narrow, 
traditional, and unchanging (Calhoun, 1993).  The opposing viewpoint, "constructivism," 
captured in the concept of civic nationalism, is more inclusive, modern, and adaptive 
(Calhoun, 1993) and considers nations to be "imagined communities" created for economic 
and political purposes (Anderson, 1991).  Of primary importance here, ethnic/cultural 
nationalism is a more exclusive concept, whereas civic nationalism is more inclusive. 
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This distinction between exclusive and inclusive conceptions of nationalism also parallels the 
distinction in the political psychology literature between nationalism and patriotism 
(Kosterman and Feshbach, 1989).  As Blank and Schmidt (2003: 305-306) note: 
"Nationalism supports homogeneity within society, blind obedience, and idealized excessive 
YDOXDWLRQRIRQH¶VRZQQDWLRQZKHUHDVSDWULRWLVPVXSSRUWVKHWHURJHQHRXVVWUXFWXUHVZLWKLQ
the society and a critical distance to the state and the regime. They are linked to different 
attitudes toward objects that are strange and different: Nationalism leads to the denigration of 
such outgroups and minorities, whereas patriotism strengthens tolerance toward such 
groups." 
Much of the modern psychology literature on nationalism attributes exclusive-nationalistic 
sentiment to those with an insecure self-identity.  Kinnvall (2004: 742) argues that in our 
modern age "[w]e live in a world that is for many a world devoid of certainty...  It is a world 
where many people feel intensified levels of insecurity as the life they once led is being 
contested and changed at the same time.  Globalization challenges simple definitions of who 
we are and where we come from."  Nationalism, she argues, supplies "particularly powerful 
stories and beliefs (discourses) through [the] ability to convey a picture of security, of a 
'home' safe from intruders... The world, in this view, 'really' consists of a direct primordial 
relationship to a certain territory (a 'home')... In this way nationalism..., as [an] identity-
signifier, increase[s] ontological security while minimizing existential anxiety" (763).  
Similarly, Dekker at al. (2003: 353) argue that those with a low sense of positive identity or 
those suffering from an identity crisis, will be most attracted to ideas relating to "a common 
origin, ancestry, or consanguinity, a wish to keep the 'nation' as pure as possible."  
Threatened by a world that appears to be ever-increasingly complex, nationalists embrace 
dogmatic and exclusive national myths of common origin as a way to provide a sense of 
stability and identity. 
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Nationalism and authoritarianism share a similar response to similar normative threat; 
individuals with either of these characteristics react negatively in the face of a diverse and 
fragmented society.  However, nationalism and authoritarianism are theorized to derive from 
differing psychological conditions.  Whereas authoritarians react against the perception of a 
pluralized society due to developing a socially maladaptive method of coping with diversity, 
nationalists aggress against ethnic/cultural pluralism due to insecurity over identity, over who 
they are and how they relate to the world.  This divergence in particulars notwithstanding, 
similar agendas are likely to appeal to each group.  Nationalists are likely to respond most 
favorably to those who will affirm a concrete and stable identity.  While this goal in and of 
itself appears fairly benign, overcoming such insecurity appears to require more than simple 
ingroup affirmation.  The evidence gathered thus far points to the additional necessity of 
denigrating any and all outgroups that appear to undermine the identity of the ingroup (Blank 
and Schmidt, 2003; Coenders and Scheepers, 2003; Davies et al., 2008).  The insecurity of 
nationalists will respond to identity development through outgroup derogation and exclusion. 
Authoritarians, on the other hand, possess a stable identity.  These individuals will respond to 
those who aim to homogenize society based on their ingroup by excluding all those who 
prevent or threaten such homogenization.  Both of these agendas focus on reducing diversity 
and securing the ingroup from outgroup threat.  This agenda is most clearly associated with 
radical right-wing populist parties, parties that are currently gaining ground across Europe. 
Radical Right-Wing Populist Parties 
Rydgren (2007: 242-243) argues that RRP parties "share a core of ethno-nationalist 
xenophobia and antiestablishment populism" and although these parties are often "hostile to 
representative democracy and the way existing democratic institutions actually work," they 
nevertheless "[participate] in public elections and [aspire] to win representation within 
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democratic political institutions."  This parliamentarianism differentiates RRP from ERP 
(extreme right-wing populist) parties - those parties often associated with fascism.  RRP 
parties are classified as right-wing largely based on their stances on sociocultural, rather than 
socioeconomic, policy.  RRP parties vary considerably when it comes to socioeconomic 
issues with many of these parties strongly supporting numerous aspects of a comprehensive 
welfare state (though only insofar as such provisions apply to nationals). 
The sociocultural aspects of RRP parties are likely to have substantial appeal among 
nationalist and authoritarian voters.  These parties frequently reference the impending loss of 
national culture and identity as a result of mass immigration and argue that immigration 
should be curtailed, if not outright stopped, in order to preserve the national culture.  Where 
RRP parties do concede to the necessity of immigration, which many of these parties do, they 
nevertheless insist on assimilation and argue vehemently against multiculturalism.  In 
Austria, the Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (Freedom Party of Austria) argue that "Austria is 
not a country of immigration. This is why we pursue a family policy centred around births. 
Legal and legitimate immigrants who are already integrated, who can speak the German 
language, who fully acknowledge our values and laws and have set down cultural roots 
should be given the right to stay and obtain citizenship."1  In Belgium, Vlaams Belang 
(Flemish Interest), argue that "[f]oreigners who want to settle down in Flanders need to 
respect our laws. They have to adapt to our culture, our standards and values, our way of 
life... For foreigners and immigrants who refuse, neglect or dispute these principles, a 
remigration policy needs to be developed."2  In Demark, the Dansk Folkeparti (Danish 
People's Party) argue that "[t]he country is founded on the Danish cultural heritage and 
                                                          
1
 http://www.fpoe.at/dafuer-stehen-wir/partei-programm/ 
2
 http://www.vlaamsbelang.org/57/2/ 
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therefore, Danish culture must be preserved and strengthened... Denmark is not an 
immigrant-country and never has been. Thus we will not accept transformation to a 
multiethnic society."3 
This somewhat moderated exclusionist sentiment often yields to more blatant scapegoating 
when sociocultural concerns are at issue.  Regardless of the socioeconomic orientation of the 
RRP party, many of these parties explicitly fault immigrants and/or foreign residents and 
visitors for increased crime and economic decline.  In Switzerland, the Schweizerische 
Volkspartei (Swiss People's Party) argue that "[m]any Swiss people no longer feel safe in 
their own country. Almost half of the crimes committed in Switzerland are carried out by 
foreigners. This situation is the consequence of uncontrolled mass immigration and lax 
punishment."  Further, "[j]obless foreigners often find that the welfare benefits on offer here 
are more attractive than working back home. Many Swiss people are unable to find work or 
are forced to take unpopular jobs. Our infrastructure is creaking under the strain: congested 
roads, overcrowded public transport and school classes made up primarily of foreign children 
are the result."4  These parties focus on the exclusion of outgroups as a remedy to many 
social and economic ills.  As Klusmeyer (1993: 105-106) notes "[t]he presence of a 
permanent caste of outsiders affords right-wing radicals a conspicuously visible target for 
their demagoguery as well as a readily available scapegoat for grievances during times of 
social and economic distress." 
Following Rydgren's (2005; Rydgren, 2007) characterization of RRP parties as championing 
intolerant and punitive policy stances on issues such as immigration and law and order, Dunn 
and Singh (2011: 317) argue that "RRP parties are the institutional equivalent of authoritarian 
                                                          
3
 http://www.danskfolkeparti.dk/The_Party_Program_of_the_Danish_Peoples_Party.asp 
4
 http://www.svp.ch/display.cfm/id/101395 
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individuals; as a group, they are markedly more intolerant and punitive toward outgroups 
than other party families."  Mudde (2007) argues that RRP parties share a core of ideological 
authoritarianism, nativism (i.e., exclusive-nationalism), and populism.  The content of RRP 
party programs certainly demonstrates a tendency toward intolerance and punitiveness as 
well as a powerfully exclusive-nationalistic theme (Betz and Johnson, 2004; Blee, 2007).  
Restriction on immigration and outright hostility toward any semblance of a multicultural 
and/or multiethnic society are themes that will resonate with both nationalists and 
authoritarians.  The focus on and affirmation of a shared history and identity in combination 
with the derogation of "criminal" foreign groups appeals perfectly to the needs of exclusive-
nationalists.  This suggests that authoritarians and exclusive-nationalists will be particularly 
drawn to RRP parties where they are electorally viable.  
Data and Analysis 
The data for the following analyses comes from the 2008 European Values Survey (EVS)5 as 
this particular survey is the only survey, to my knowledge, that provides the three measures 
essential for an analysis of whether those who prefer RRP parties are more likely to be 
authoritarian and/or exclusive-nationalist: a measure of authoritarianism, a measure of 
exclusive-nationalism, and a broad measure of party preference. 
A number of restrictions are applied to the data in order to minimize biased or spurious 
results.  Only established democracies are considered to ensure that the results of the analyses 
are not confounded with party-system instability.  To ensure an acceptable level of variation 
in the data, only those parties that are preferred by 50 individuals or 5% of the sample (which 
turn out to be parallel requirements) are included in the study.  This also results in the 
inclusion of only electorally viable parties in the data as those parties which are not 
                                                          
5
 http://www.europeanvaluesstudy.eu/ 
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electorally viable are mostly not inquired about on survey instruments and those few that are 
do not receive enough support, if they receive any, to be included under the above 
requirement.  The following analyses therefore focus on five Western European countries that 
have electorally viable, radical right-wing populist parties: Austria, Belgium, Denmark,  the 
Netherlands, and Switzerland.  These countries parallel those studied in previous research on 
RRP parties (e.g., Heinisch, 2003; Ivarsflaten, 2008; Knigge, 1998; Minkenberg, 2001; 
Oesch, 2008). 
Table 1 lists the parties I classify as RRP parties in this study along with data from the EVS 
regarding the location of the party on the Left-Right scale (according to the EVS method 
reports) and the percentage of individuals who report support for the party.  Each of these 
parties falls on the right or extreme right based on the methodological reports of the EVS,6 a 
classification that clearly accounts for far more than just socioeconomic policy ± as noted by 
Rydgren (2007), RRP parties are more often classified in terms of sociocultural rather than 
socioeconomic policy stances. 
Further, I include the vote percentage each party achieved in the previous parliamentary 
election.  This allows for comparison between the percentage of party support in the sample 
and the percentage of party support in terms of recent electoral history.  As is apparent from 
the table, RRP parties in Austria, Belgium, and Denmark all under report their electoral 
support in the most recent parliamentary election.  While there are myriad possible reasons 
for this, it is still a fact that should be kept in mind when considering the conclusions to this 
study. 
--INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE-- 
                                                          
6
 This variable ranges from 1 to 10, with 1 indicating the extreme left and 10 indicating the 
extreme right. 
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I follow Feldman and Stenner's (1997) technique for measuring an authoritarian 
predisposition (see also, Dunn and Singh, 2011; Dunn and Singh, forthcoming; Federico et 
al., 2011; Hetherington and Suhay, 2011; Hetherington and Weiler, 2009; Oyamot Jr et al., 
2012; Singh and Dunn, forthcoming; Stenner, 2005; Stenner, 2009).  This measure separates 
an authoritarian predisposition, the tendency to become more intolerant and punitive under 
conditions of normative threat (threat to group unity and uniformity), from intolerant and 
punitive attitudes.  The measure is comprised of four items inquiring into a respondent's 
belief as to appropriate qualities to teach children at home ("Here is a list of qualities which 
children can be encouraged to learn at home. Which, if any, do you consider to be especially 
important? Please choose up to five!"): independence, imagination, tolerance and respect for 
others, and obedience.  The first three items were coded so that a 1 indicates the quality is not 
considered important and 0 indicates that it is.  The fourth item, obedience, was coded in 
reverse fashion.  The items were then summed to create a formative scale ranging from 0 to 4 
(cf., Diamantopoulos et al., 2008; Singh and Dunn, forthcoming). 
The exclusive-nationalism scale is created from 3 items inquiring into whether or not the 
respondent believes certain characteristics are necessary in order to be classified as a national 
("Some people say the following things are important for being truly [NATIONALITY]. 
Others say they are not important. How important do you think each of the following is?"): to 
have been born in [COUNTRY], tR KDYH >&28175<@¶V DQFHVWU\, and to have lived for a 
long time in [COUNTRY].  All items load on a single factor and were combined to form a 
reflective summated rating scale.  Country-by-country, the alpha varies slightly and drops 
slightly below the standard level of acceptability (0.70) in Switzerland: Austria, 0.77; 
Belgium, 0.75; Denmark, 0.77; the Netherlands, 0.74; and Switzerland, 0.69. 
Party preference is determined via reference to two variables in the EVS.  The lead up 
question asks: "If there was a general election tomorrow, can you tell me if you would vote?"  
14 
 
A "yes" is followed up with: "which party would you vote for?"  A "no" with: "which party 
appeals to you most?"  Those who did not provide a party to either inquiry were dropped 
from the analyses.  Of those who provided a party, 95% of respondents answered "yes" 
(Austria, 94%; Belgium, 100%; Denmark, 99%; the Netherlands, 92%; Switzerland, 85%) 
with the remainder answering in the negative.  These two variables are combined to create the 
party preference variable.  As noted in Table 1, those who prefer electorally-viable RRP 
parties ranges from 5.71% for Flemish Interest in Belgium to 24.47% for the Swiss People's 
Party in Switzerland.  In terms of basic demographics, the median individual who prefers a 
RRP party in Austria is a 50 year old male with a secondary education and an average 
income; in Belgium, is a 46 year old male with a secondary education and an average 
income; in Denmark is a 53 year old male with a secondary education and an average 
income; in the Netherlands is a 55 year old male with a secondary education and an average 
income; and in Switzerland is a 48 year old female with a secondary education and an 
average income. 
Figures 1 through 5 plot the percent of party supporters who score in roughly the top quartile 
of the authoritarianism and exclusive-nationalism measures for each country.7  In every 
country, RRP parties boast a higher percentage of individuals who score in the top quartile of 
the exclusive-nationalism scale for each country.  This ranges from a low of 32.10% for 
DHQPDUN¶V'DQLVK3HRSOH¶V3DUW\WRIRU%HOJLXP¶V)OHPLVK,QWHUHVW. 
This pattern is not as consistent for the authoritarianism scale.  The same pattern holds true 
for Belgium, Denmark, and Switzerland; however, in Austria, the larger Social Democratic 
Party of Austria and the Austrian People's Party and in the Netherlands, the considerably 
                                                          
7 Due to the distribution of the variables, a precise quartile could not be attained.  The percentile accounted 
for in each table is as follows, referencing authoritarianism and exclusive-nationalism, respectively:: Austria: 
24.5% & 20.93%; Belgium: 30.8% & 21.4%; Denmark: 25.1% & 19.2%; the Netherlands: 21.47% & 21.94%; and 
Switzerland: 36.4% & 25.1%. 
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larger Christian Democratic Party, all report higher numbers of supporters in the top quartile 
of the authoritarianism scale than do the RRP parties. 
--INSERT FIGURES 1 - 5 ABOUT HERE-- 
Analyses of means reveal identical patterns to those revealed in Figures 1 through 5; in each 
country, those who prefer RRP parties report a higher mean level of exclusive nationalism 
than any other party - though there is no statistical difference between the mean level of 
exclusive nationalism of those who prefer RRP parties and many of those who prefer other 
parties within each country.  However, in all countries, the difference between the mean level 
of exclusive nationalism for those who prefer RRP parties is significantly and substantially 
different from the parties preferred by the least exclusive-nationalistic individuals. 
Again, following the pattern revealed in Figures 1 though 5, the highest mean level of 
authoritarianism is not always reported by those who prefer RRP parties.  Though in 
Belgium, Denmark, and Switzerland those who prefer RRP parties do report the highest mean 
level of authoritarianism, in Austria, those who prefer the Social Democratic Party of Austria 
and the Austrian People's Party report higher levels of authoritarianism than do those who 
prefer the Austrian Freedom Party and the Alliance for the Future of Austria, and in the 
Netherlands, those who prefer the Christian Democratic Party report higher levels of 
authoritarianism than do those who prefer Proud of the Netherlands. 
Moving away from descriptive analyses, Table 2 displays the output for country-by-country 
logistical analysis of preference for RRP parties.  The dependent variable in these analyses is 
whether or not an individual prefers a RRP party; 1 if a RRP party is preferred, 0 if not (see 
above for party preference coding details).  The coding of the two primary independent 
variables, exclusive-nationalism and authoritarianism, is described above.  The models also 
control for an number of demographic variables - age, education, female, income - as well as 
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political interest and religiosity.  Age is a simple measure of the respondent's age in years.  
Education is a measure of D UHVSRQGHQW¶V UHSRUWHG OHYHO RI education ranging from 0 to 6, 
FRGHG XVLQJ 81(6&2¶V ,QWHUQDWLRQDO 6WDQGDUG &ODVVLILFDWLRQ RI (GXFDWLRQ ,6&(' 
Pre-primary education or none education, 1: Primary education or first stage of basic 
education, 2: Lower secondary or second stage of basic education, 3: Upper secondary 
education, 4: Post-secondary non-tertiary education, 5: First stage of tertiary education, 6: 
Second stage of tertiary education).  Female is a simple binary indicator of a respondent's 
gender; 1 indicating female, 0 indicating male.  Income LV D VHOI UHSRUWRIRQH¶VKRXVHKROG
income on a 10 point scale; 1 being the lowest and 10 being the highest income level.  
Political interest is a reflective, standardized scale comprised of 4 items indicating interest in 
politics: how important is politics in your life, how often do you discuss politics with friends, 
how interested are you in politics, and how often do you follow politics in media.  Pooling 
the items across countries, all items load moderately to strongly on a single factor and 
produce a scale reliability coefficient of 0.78; a higher value indicates a higher level of 
political interest.  Religiosity is a reflective, standardized scale comprised of 5 items 
indicating a respRQGHQW¶V GHJUHH RI UHOLJLRVLW\ how important is religion in your life, how 
often do you attend religious services, are you a religious person, how important is God in 
your life, and how often do you pray to God outside religious services.  Pooling the items 
across countries, all items load strongly on a single factor and produce a scale reliability 
coefficient of 0.88; a higher value indicates a higher level of religiosity. 
--INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE-- 
Table 2 provides further evidence that exclusive-nationalism consistently predicts RRP party 
support, whereas authoritarianism does so only in the cases of Denmark and Switzerland.  
More detailed analyses demonstrate that, with all other variables set to their mean, the 
predicted probabilities for preferring a RRP party over all others increases substantially for 
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exclusive-nationalists in each country in these analyses: in Austria the probability increases 
from 0.04 at the lowest level of exclusive-nationalism to 0.19 at the highest; in Belgium this 
increases from 0.01 to 0.07; in Denmark, from 0.02 to 0.16; in the Netherlands, from 0.03 to 
0.15; and in Switzerland, from 0.07 to 0.41. 
Aligning with the descriptive evidence above, authoritarianism is a less consistent predictor 
of RRP party support.  Most intriguingly, in Austria the relationship, though statistically 
insignificant, is reversed, with the probability of preferring a RRP party decreasing from a 
probability of 0.13 at the lowest level of authoritarianism to 0.08 at the highest, all else equal.  
For Denmark and Switzerland, the two countries where authoritarianism is a significant 
predictor of RRP party preference, an increase from the lowest to the highest level of 
authoritarianism increases the probability of preferring a RRP party from 0.04 to 0.15 and 
0.14 to 0.45, respectively. 
More detailed between-party differences are shown in Tables 3 through 7 which display the 
results of country-by-country multinomial logistic regressions using RRP party preference 
(the Austrian Freedom Party in Austria) as the base outcome category.  These models display 
the odds of choosing the listed party over the base category RRP party.  The parties are 
organized according to their mean nationalism scores; parties with lower mean scores are 
listed first. 
--INSERT TABLES 3 - 7 HERE-- 
Tables 3 through 7 indicate that in each country, the base category RRP party is more likely 
to be preferred to all other parties (except the RRP Alliance for the Future of Austria) by 
more exclusive-nationalistic individuals.  This relationship is statistically significant in 18 of 
the 24 (RRP to non-RRP) comparisons.  Even in those cases where standard levels of 
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statistical significance are not met, the relative-risk ratio is substantially less than 1 (which 
would indicate equal odds).  
The relationship between authoritarianism and RRP party preference, again, is considerably 
less consistent.  In only 11 of the 24 (RRP to non-RRP) comparisons are authoritarian 
individuals statistically more or less likely to prefer RRP parties.  In Belgium, 
authoritarianism does not attain statistical significance in a single comparison.  Further, in 
three cases (though only one is statistically significant), authoritarian individuals are more 
likely to prefer a non-RRP party (the Social Democratic Party of Austria and the Austrian 
3HRSOH¶V3DUW\LQ$XVWULDDQGWKH&KULVWLDQ'HPRFUDWLF3DUW\LQWKH1HWKHUODQGV. 
Table 8 details the change in the predicted probability from the minimum to the maximum 
values of exclusive-nationalism and authoritarianism, based on the corresponding 
multinomial logistic regression model output.  In all 5 countries, RRP parties benefit 
relatively substantially from an increase in exclusive-nationalism.  In 3 of 5 countries, RRP 
parties gain the most from an increase from the minimum to the maximum level of 
nationalism; in Belgium, Flemish Interest comes second to the Socialist Party and in the 
Netherlands, Proud of the Netherlands comes second to the Christian Democratic Party. 
--INSERT TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE-- 
Authoritarianism, again, does not repeat this pattern.  In Austria, the two RRP parties suffer 
from a LQGLYLGXDO¶V increase in authoritarianism.  In Belgium, the change in probability is 
practically ]HUR,Q'HPDUNWKH'DQLVK3HRSOH¶V3DUW\EHQHILWVIDLUO\VXEVWDQWLDOO\IURPDQ
increase in authoritarianism, but this benefit is eclipsed by the benefit gained by the Left, 
Liberal Party.  In the Netherlands, a change from the minimum to the maximum value on the 
authoritarianism scale increases the probability of preferring a RRP party, but only slightly 
and this benefit is massively overshadowed by the benefit gained by the Christian Democratic 
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Party.  Only in Switzerland does the RRP pDUW\WKH6ZLVV3HRSOH¶V3DUW\, gain a primary and 
substantial benefit from authoritarian voters. 
Discussion 
The authoritarianism literature arose from the attempt to understand those who supported the 
Nazi party previous to and during World War II Germany.  Though the aims of the 
authoritarianism literature are now much more diverse and no longer explicitly aim to answer 
this question, there is often the implication, if not the explicit suggestion, that in the 
established democracies, authoritarians prefer radical right-wing populist parties.  While this 
assumption appears reasonable, there has been little, if any, cross-national research that 
directly tests this.  This paper is a first step in resolving this deficiency. 
The primary intent of this paper is to examine whether the suggestion that authoritarians will 
always prefer RRP parties holds.  I also examine whether this thesis holds for exclusive-
nationalists.  While early research (Adorno et al., 1950), and even some more modern 
research (e.g., Kitschelt, 1992), in the authoritarianism literature closely associate exclusive-
nationalism with authoritarianism, the psychological research suggests that although both 
characteristics motivate intolerant and punitive attitudes toward outgroups, they derive from 
differing psychological foundations.  This research shows that while these variables are 
correlated, it is to a very modest degree (r = 0.24, p < 0.05, for the pooled sample).  As such, 
and as the programs of RRP parties are likely to appeal as much to exclusive-nationalists as 
authoritarians, exclusive-nationalism is also examined. 
Beginning with simple descriptive analyses and then moving on to logistical and multinomial 
logistical analyses of RRP parties in 5 West European countries (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, 
the Netherlands, and Switzerland), I present evidence which indicates that authoritarianism 
only inconsistently predicts preference for RRP parties.  In Austria and the Netherlands, non-
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RRP parties (in Austria, the Social Democratic Party and the Austrian People's Party; in the 
Netherlands, the Christian Democratic Party) boast a higher proportion of supporters who 
score in the top-quartile of the authoritarianism scale as well as a higher mean 
authoritarianism score.  In logistic regression analyses, authoritarianism only predicts 
preference for RRP parties over all other parties in Demark and Switzerland.  In multinomial 
logistic regression analyses, authoritarian individuals are more likely to prefer RRP parties in 
only 46% (11 of 24) of the party-to-party comparisons.  In Belgium, authoritarianism does 
not significantly predict the preference of the RRP over a single other party.  In Austria, the 
probability of preferring a RRP party actually declines as authoritarianism increases.  
Authoritarianism is clearly not a consistent predictor of preference for RRP parties across 
countries. 
The story for exclusive-nationalism is quite different.  In all 5 countries, RRP parties boast a 
higher proportion of individuals who score in the top quartile of the exclusive-nationalism 
measure and report a higher mean level of exclusive-nationalism among their supporters.  
Logistic regression models indicate that RRP parties are preferred by exclusive-nationalists to 
all other parties in all 5 countries.  Multinomial logistic regression models indicate that 
exclusive-nationalist individuals are more likely to prefer RRP parties in 75% (18 of 24) of 
the party-to-party comparisons.  In all 5 countries, RRP parties benefit from higher levels of 
exclusive-nationalism, and in 3 of those 5, RRP parties benefit more than any other party 
(they come in second in the remaining 2 countries).  Exclusive-nationalism is a strong 
predictor of preference for a RRP party but can also serve to predict support for other parties 
which espouse exclusive-nationalist rhetoric. 
While RRP party supporters do possess more authoritarian (intolerant and punitive) attitudes 
(Billiet and De Witte, 1995; Van Hiel and Mervielde, 2002), the evidence provided here 
effectively repudiates the idea that authoritarians will unconditionally support electorally 
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viable radical right-wing populist parties.  It is perhaps the distinction between authoritarian 
attitudes and authoritarianism (or an authoritarian predisposition) that spawns confusion over 
the relationship between RRP parties and authoritarian individuals.  This confusion is 
certainly understandable given that the previous conceptualization of authoritarianism 
focused on attitudes rather than a psychological (pre)disposition.  Altemeyer (1981; 1988; 
1996), perhaps the most influential scholar in authoritarianism research over the past few 
decades, considers authoritarianism to be learned syndrome, a collection of attitudes that 
cluster into three facets: submission, aggression, and conventionalism.  As RRP party 
VXSSRUWHUV KROG PRUH DXWKRULWDULDQ DWWLWXGHV WKDQ RWKHUV DQG DV $OWHPH\HU¶V FRQFHSWLRQ RI
authoritarianism classifies those with the most authoritarian attitudes to be the most 
authoritarian, RRP party supporters are, therefore, the most authoritarian.  However, this 
conception of authoritarianism has largely been abandoned in favor of a more dynamic 
approach (cf., Feldman and Stenner, 1997; Stenner, 2005; Stenner, 2009) as authoritarian 
attitudes can even be evoked among non-authoritarian individuals under conditions of 
existential threat (Hetherington and Suhay, 2011; Hetherington and Weiler, 2009).  Our 
preconceived notions regarding the relationship between these parties and authoritarians, 
then, need rethinking; authoritarians, as currently conceptualized, do not necessarily prefer 
RRP parties to all others. 
Current theory on authoritarianism does not predict an unconditional relationship between 
authoritarianism and RRP party support.  Support for RRP parties among authoritarians may 
be conditional as recent work reveals authoritarianism to be a dynamic characteristic that 
responds to environmental conditions; authoritarians become more intolerant under 
conditions of social and political fragmentation (Dunn and Singh, 2011; Dunn and Singh, 
forthcoming; Feldman and Stenner, 1997; Singh and Dunn, forthcoming; Stenner, 2005; 
Stenner, 2009).  Further, authoritarians are highly norm adherent and concerned with 
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maintaining congruence with their ingroup (Altemeyer, 1996; Oyamot Jr et al., 2012).  It may 
well be that authoritarians are more likely to respond to RRP party rhetoric to unify and 
homogenize the nation when they perceive an increase in social and political fragmentation 
and when these parties are legitimized as within the mainstream.  Supporting this supposition, 
research in the RRP party literature often reveals a positive correlation between RRP party 
support and cultural and economic insecurity and/or threat (Biggs and Knauss, 2012; Bowyer, 
2008; Goodwin et al., 2012; Lucassen and Lubbers, 2012; Rydgren and Ruth, 2011); and the 
political fortune of RRP parties increases when they are legitimatized by mainstream parties 
(Dahlström and Sundell, 2012) and/or the media (Koopmans and Muis, 2009; Vliegenthart et 
al., 2012).  Direct examination of such a proposal, however, requires considerably broader 
and more detailed data than that used in this paper and is therefore left for future research.  
The next step for authoritarianism research in this line of questioning, then, is to uncover why 
authoritarians support the parties they do when they do, or conversely, why authoritarians do 
not support RRP parties when they do not. 
For those more interested in the correlates or causes of RRP party support rather than the 
political-behavioral profile of authoritarians, the take home message here is that 
authoritarianism is not unconditionally related to such while exclusive-nationalism appears to 
be.  It is nevertheless important that considerations of authoritarianism do not fall by the 
wayside in the RRP party literature.  Some of the more recent research in the RRP party 
literature noted above considers threat a mediating factor for RRP party support.  This 
meshes well with the emerging research paradigm in the authoritarianism literature which not 
only suggests that RRP parties may be more appealing to normatively threatened 
authoritarians, but also that such parties may be more appealing to non-authoritarians who are 
existentially threatened (cf., Hetherington and Suhay, 2011; Hetherington and Weiler, 2009).  
The RRP party literature has already opened the door to the idea that different forms of threat 
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(normative versus existential) may influence RRP party support in differing fashion (e.g., 
Lucassen and Lubbers, 2012).  Consideration of authoritarianism alongside of diverse forms 
of threat, then, may provide additional leverage over the question of RRP party support. 
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Table 1: Radical right-wing populist party data from the CMP and the EVS 
     
  
EVS 
 Country (EVS year) Party Name (in English) Left-Right % of Sample Vote Share 
Austria (2008) Freedom Party of Austria 9 11.98 17.50% 
Austria (2008) Alliance for the Future of Austria 8 6.71 10.70% 
Belgium (2009) Flemmish Interest 10 5.71 11.99% 
Denmark (2008) Danish People's Party 10 8.92 13.90% 
Netherlands (2008) Group Verdonk/Proud of the Netherlands 9 7.85 7.36% 
Switzerland (2008) Swiss People's Party 8 24.47 22.24% 
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Table 2: Logistical regression of RRP preference (odds-ratios) 
           
 
Austria Belgium Denmark Netherlands Switzerland 
 
ɴ s.e. ɴ s.e. ɴ s.e. ɴ s.e. ɴ s.e. 
Age 1.01 0.01 1.01 0.01 1.00 0.01 1.00 0.01 0.99 0.01 
Education 0.92 0.15 0.88 0.11 0.59 0.08 0.78 0.08 0.67 0.08 
Female 0.78 0.21 0.52 0.16 1.07 0.28 0.62 0.16 0.89 0.22 
Income 1.00 0.07 1.10 0.10 0.98 0.07 1.20 0.09 1.08 0.07 
Political Interest 0.95 0.18 0.41 0.09 1.00 0.19 1.02 0.18 1.00 0.18 
Religiosity 0.63 0.11 0.54 0.12 0.59 0.13 0.81 0.12 0.85 0.14 
           Authoritarianism 0.86 0.12 1.18 0.20 1.43 0.20 1.23 0.17 1.51 0.20 
Nationalism 1.73 0.33 1.73 0.36 2.03 0.35 1.71 0.34 2.07 0.38 
           n 626 963 908 955 470 
pseudo-R2 0.05 0.14 0.12 0.06 0.11 
correctly classified 88.02% 94.29% 90.86% 92.15% 77.23% 
Note: Bolded items are significant at the 0.05 level. 
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Table 3: Multinomial logistic regression of RRP party preference in 
Austria (relative-risk ratios) 
     
 
The Austrian 
Greens 
Social Democratic 
Party of Austria 
 
ɴ s.e. ɴ s.e. 
Age 0.97 0.01 0.99 0.01 
Education 1.46 0.29 0.87 0.15 
Female 1.64 0.57 1.39 0.40 
Income 0.84 0.07 0.99 0.08 
Political Interest 1.19 0.29 1.21 0.24 
Religiosity 1.15 0.26 1.26 0.24 
     Authoritarianism 0.62 0.11 1.59 0.23 
Nationalism 0.35 0.09 0.54 0.11 
     
 
Austrian 
People's Party 
Alliance for the 
Future of Austria 
 
ɴ s.e. ɴ s.e. 
Age 1.02 0.01 0.98 0.01 
Education 1.28 0.24 1.10 0.28 
Female 1.19 0.38 0.64 0.28 
Income 1.13 0.10 1.30 0.15 
Political Interest 1.01 0.23 0.51 0.15 
Religiosity 4.09 0.94 1.28 0.37 
     Authoritarianism 1.20 0.19 0.78 0.18 
Nationalism 0.64 0.15 1.67 0.53 
     n 626 
   pseudo-R2 0.17       
Note: Bolded items are significant at the 0.05 level. 
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Table 4: Multinomial logistic regression of RRP party preference in Belgium 
(relative-risk ratios) 
       
 
Ecology 
Different 
Socialist Party 
New Flemish 
Alliance 
 
ɴ s.e. ɴ s.e. ɴ s.e. 
Age 0.99 0.01 0.99 0.01 1.00 0.01 
Education 1.62 0.25 1.00 0.15 1.29 0.21 
Female 2.37 0.87 2.32 0.85 1.32 0.51 
Income 0.83 0.09 0.90 0.10 1.11 0.13 
Political Interest 2.44 0.61 2.49 0.62 2.91 0.76 
Religiosity 1.27 0.32 1.38 0.35 1.75 0.46 
       Authoritarianism 0.84 0.17 0.83 0.17 0.72 0.15 
Nationalism 0.37 0.09 0.40 0.10 0.59 0.16 
       
 
Open Flemish Liberals 
and Democrats 
Reformist 
Movement 
Humanist 
Democratic Center 
 
ɴ s.e. ɴ s.e. ɴ s.e. 
Age 1.01 0.01 1.00 0.01 0.99 0.01 
Education 1.06 0.17 1.37 0.21 1.40 0.22 
Female 1.64 0.62 1.86 0.68 2.80 1.07 
Income 1.10 0.12 0.92 0.10 0.94 0.11 
Political Interest 2.07 0.53 2.56 0.64 2.81 0.73 
Religiosity 1.80 0.47 1.23 0.32 3.97 1.06 
       Authoritarianism 0.73 0.15 0.94 0.19 1.06 0.22 
Nationalism 0.56 0.14 0.64 0.16 0.67 0.17 
       
 
Christian Democratic 
and Flemish Party Socialist Party 
  
 
ɴ s.e. ɴ s.e. 
  Age 1.00 0.01 0.98 0.01 
  Education 1.04 0.15 0.91 0.13 
  Female 2.25 0.78 1.60 0.54 
  Income 1.04 0.11 0.76 0.08 
  Political Interest 2.45 0.58 2.19 0.50 
  Religiosity 4.23 1.04 1.33 0.32 
  
       Authoritarianism 0.87 0.17 0.88 0.16 
  Nationalism 0.60 0.14 0.73 0.17 
  
       n 963 
     pseudo-R2 0.09           
Note: Bolded items are significant at the 0.05 level. 
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Table 5: Multinomial logistic regression of RRP party preference in Denmark (relative-risk ratios) 
       
 
Socialist People's 
Party Radical Left Party Social Democrats 
 
ɴ s.e. ɴ s.e. ɴ s.e. 
Age 0.99 0.01 0.98 0.01 1.01 0.01 
Education 1.71 0.25 2.67 0.49 1.60 0.23 
Female 2.09 0.64 1.01 0.38 0.89 0.26 
Income 0.88 0.07 0.94 0.09 0.99 0.08 
Political Interest 1.28 0.29 2.08 0.62 0.81 0.17 
Religiosity 1.24 0.30 1.42 0.41 1.76 0.42 
       Authoritarianism 0.51 0.09 0.49 0.11 0.71 0.11 
Nationalism 0.34 0.07 0.40 0.11 0.47 0.09 
       
 
Left, Liberal Party 
of Denmark 
Conservative 
People's Party 
  
 
ɴ s.e. ɴ s.e. 
  Age 1.00 0.01 0.99 0.01 
  Education 1.54 0.22 1.93 0.33 
  Female 0.67 0.19 0.72 0.26 
  Income 1.18 0.09 1.02 0.10 
  Political Interest 0.90 0.18 1.13 0.30 
  Religiosity 1.92 0.44 2.09 0.59 
  
       Authoritarianism 0.83 0.12 0.60 0.12 
  Nationalism 0.58 0.11 0.71 0.17 
  
       n 908 
     pseudo-R2 0.09           
Note: Bolded items are significant at the 0.05 level. 
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Table 6: Multinomial logistic regression of RRP party preference in the Netherlands (relative-risk 
ratios) 
       
 
Green Left Democrats 66 Labour Party 
 
ɴ s.e. ɴ s.e. ɴ s.e. 
Age 1.00 0.01 1.00 0.01 1.01 0.01 
Education 1.75 0.27 1.57 0.22 1.23 0.15 
Female 5.89 2.37 1.78 0.61 1.65 0.50 
Income 0.74 0.08 0.72 0.07 0.75 0.07 
Political Interest 1.68 0.48 1.64 0.42 0.87 0.18 
Religiosity 0.74 0.18 0.52 0.12 0.77 0.14 
       Authoritarianism 0.49 0.11 0.59 0.11 0.84 0.14 
Nationalism 0.38 0.11 0.52 0.14 0.43 0.10 
       
 
Socialist Party Liberals 
Christian 
Democratic Party 
 
ɴ s.e. ɴ s.e. ɴ s.e. 
Age 0.99 0.01 0.99 0.01 1.01 0.01 
Education 1.22 0.16 1.22 0.15 1.21 0.14 
Female 1.64 0.52 1.30 0.40 1.40 0.41 
Income 0.69 0.06 1.00 0.09 0.97 0.08 
Political Interest 0.83 0.18 1.25 0.27 0.81 0.17 
Religiosity 0.92 0.18 0.86 0.16 3.24 0.60 
       Authoritarianism 0.70 0.12 0.75 0.13 1.06 0.17 
Nationalism 0.50 0.12 0.72 0.17 0.78 0.18 
       n 955 
     pseudo-R2 0.14           
Note: Bolded items are significant at the 0.05 level. 
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Table 7: Multinomial logistic regression of RRP party preference in 
Switzerland (relative-risk ratios) 
     
 
Green Party Socialist Party 
 
ɴ s.e. ɴ s.e. 
Age 1.00 0.01 1.01 0.01 
Education 1.55 0.26 1.35 0.18 
Female 2.63 1.00 1.44 0.42 
Income 0.83 0.07 0.88 0.06 
Political Interest 0.86 0.23 1.31 0.28 
Religiosity 0.64 0.16 0.99 0.20 
     Authoritarianism 0.56 0.12 0.59 0.10 
Nationalism 0.34 0.10 0.37 0.08 
     
 
Radicals 
Christian 
Democrats 
 
ɴ s.e. ɴ s.e. 
Age 1.02 0.01 1.01 0.01 
Education 1.67 0.24 1.43 0.22 
Female 0.90 0.28 0.52 0.18 
Income 1.04 0.09 0.97 0.08 
Political Interest 0.90 0.20 0.79 0.20 
Religiosity 0.89 0.19 3.80 0.99 
     Authoritarianism 0.81 0.14 0.70 0.13 
Nationalism 0.63 0.15 0.73 0.18 
     n 470 
   pseudo-R2 0.12       
Note: Bolded items are significant at the 0.05 level. 
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Table 8: Change in the predicted probability of voting for any given party over the range of exclusive 
nationalism and authoritarianism 
       
 
Nationalism Authoritarianism 
 
=1 =4 delta =0 =4 delta 
Austria 
      The Austrian Greens 0.28 0.06 -0.22 0.31 0.02 -0.29 
Social Democratic Party of Austria 0.50 0.38 -0.12 0.27 0.74 0.47 
Austrian People's Party 0.17 0.20 0.04 0.19 0.16 -0.02 
Alliance for the Future of Austria 0.01 0.14 0.13 0.08 0.01 -0.07 
Austrian Freedom Party 0.05 0.22 0.17 0.16 0.07 -0.09 
Belgium 
      Ecology 0.20 0.05 -0.15 0.11 0.10 -0.01 
Different Socialist Party 0.19 0.06 -0.12 0.12 0.11 -0.02 
New Flemish Alliance 0.08 0.09 0.01 0.13 0.06 -0.06 
Open Flemish Liberals & Democrats 0.10 0.09 -0.01 0.14 0.07 -0.07 
Reformist Movement 0.09 0.13 0.04 0.09 0.13 0.04 
Humanist Democratic Center 0.06 0.10 0.04 0.06 0.13 0.07 
Christian Democratic & Flemish Party 0.15 0.17 0.02 0.16 0.17 0.01 
Socialist Party 0.11 0.22 0.11 0.16 0.18 0.02 
Flemish Interest 0.02 0.08 0.07 0.03 0.05 0.02 
Denmark 
      Socialist People's Party 0.34 0.10 -0.25 0.27 0.07 -0.20 
Radical Left Party 0.07 0.03 -0.04 0.08 0.02 -0.06 
Social Democrats 0.26 0.20 -0.05 0.24 0.23 -0.01 
Left, Liberal Party of Denmark 0.25 0.37 0.12 0.27 0.47 0.21 
Conservative People's Party 0.05 0.13 0.08 0.10 0.05 -0.05 
Danish People's Party 0.02 0.17 0.14 0.04 0.16 0.12 
The Netherlands 
      Green Left 0.08 0.02 -0.06 0.10 0.01 -0.09 
Democrats 66 0.10 0.06 -0.04 0.14 0.04 -0.10 
Labour Party 0.32 0.11 -0.21 0.19 0.22 0.02 
Socialist Party 0.18 0.10 -0.08 0.18 0.09 -0.09 
Liberals 0.13 0.22 0.09 0.20 0.14 -0.06 
Christian Democratic Party 0.15 0.31 0.16 0.13 0.38 0.24 
Proud of the Netherlands 0.04 0.18 0.14 0.06 0.12 0.07 
Switzerland 
      Green Party 0.21 0.05 -0.16 0.15 0.04 -0.10 
Socialist Party 0.51 0.15 -0.35 0.39 0.14 -0.25 
Radicals 0.15 0.22 0.07 0.18 0.24 0.06 
Christian Democrats 0.06 0.14 0.08 0.12 0.09 -0.03 
Swiss People's Party 0.07 0.44 0.37 0.16 0.48 0.32 
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Figure 1: The percent of party supporters who score in the top quartile of the exclusive-
nationalism and authoritarianism measures in Austria. 
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Figure 2: The percent of party supporters who score in the top quartile of the exclusive-
nationalism and authoritarianism measures in Belgium. 
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Figure 3: The percent of party supporters who score in the top quartile of the exclusive-
nationalism and authoritarianism measures in Denmark. 
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Figure 4: The percent of party supporters who score in the top quartile of the exclusive-
nationalism and authoritarianism measures in the Netherlands. 
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Figure 5: The percent of party supporters who score in the top quartile of the exclusive-
nationalism and authoritarianism measures in Switzerland. 
 
 
